and have found that a "reasonably generous" credit could reduce the number of uninsured individuals by roughly 50 percent. However, simulations by Gruber (2000a,b) and Gruber and Levitt (2000) suggest that a health insurance tax credit might reduce the number of uninsured by only about 10 percent. 1 One way to advance understanding of existing simulations of tax credits for health insurance-and of the likely effects of tax credits-is to replicate those simulations and test the extent to which they are sensitive to the assumptions that were maintained to produce them. In this paper, we attempt to replicate Jonathan Gruber and Larry Levitt's simulations of the extent to which tax credits for health insurance would reduce the extent of uninsurance in the United States (Gruber 2000a,b; Gruber and Levitt 2000) . The findings from this exercise are most relevant to Gruber's widely discussed findings and to the particular tax credit analyzed. The simulations should not be interpreted as being relevant to proposals that, for example, would cover different populations, would apply tax credits of a different amount, or would eliminate the exclusion of employer contributions for employees' health insurance premiums from employees' taxable income. Nevertheless, we feel that we learn two main lessons from these attempts at replication. First, in writing out and examining Gruber's simulation model, we find that the assumptions underlying the model tend to yield what might be considered lower-bound estimates of the extent to which the credit would be accepted and of the credit's impact on uninsurance.
Second, we find that relatively minor changes in assumptions result in quite large changes in simulated results; that is, the simulations are rather sensitive to changes in assumptions. This sensitivity highlights the uncertainty inherent in modeling the effects of tax credits for health insurance.
Section 1 outlines the structure of the simulations, and Section 2 sets out the equations that drive the simulations. The equations amount to rules for assigning a probability of accepting the tax credit (that is, a take-up probability) to each observation in the sample. Section 3 describes the data we use-the 1999 Current Population Survey (which is the basis of the simulations) and the 1999 Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Benefits (which we use to "stretch" the CPS and make imputations of data missing from the CPS). Section 4 describes three imputations we make in order to implement the simulations. Specifically, for each person covered by employer-provided group health insurance, we impute the health insurance premium and employee contribution. Also, we impute the premium that each person in the sample would pay if he or she switched to private nonemployer health insurance (the so-called market premium).
Section 5 presents and describes the results and sensitivity tests, and Section 6 offers concluding remarks. Gruber's (2000a) simulation model is essentially a set of rules for determining whether a given individual (or family) would accept a federal refundable tax credit of $1,000 (for a single individual) or $2,000 (for a family) for privately purchased health insurance. Gruber began by identifying four groups, each of which faces different circumstances with respect to health insurance: 1) those currently covered by employer-provided group health insurance, 2) those covered by private nonemployer insurance, 3) those covered by Medicaid, 4) those currently uninsured.
Structure of the Simulation
The decision whether to accept a refundable tax credit must be modeled separately for each group. Accordingly, an equation is specified for each group that yields a "take-up probability"-that is, the probability of a person accepting the tax credit-for each person in that group. (The equations are described in the next section.) For individuals currently covered by private nonemployer health insurance, accepting the refundable tax credit implies no change in health insurance status because the tax credit is applied to health insurance that already covers them. For individuals in the other three groups-covered by employer-provided group health insurance, covered by Medicaid, and currently uninsured-accepting the tax credit does imply a change in health insurance status: Those covered by employer-provided insurance and Medicaid move to credit-subsidized private health insurance and remain insured. Those who are uninsured become insured under a private nonemployer plan.
The goal of the simulation is to model take-up of the credit (which, for three of the groups, implies a change of insurance status) and then to determine the implications of a given pattern of take-up for the total cost of the tax credit and its impact on aggregate health insurance coverage. A main goal of our replication is to make clear the implications of assumptions about take-up for the simulated results. In particular, we examine the sensitivity of the simulated results to variation in the model's key parameters.
Take-up Rates
Predictions about the probability of accepting the refundable tax credit are central to the simulations because they predict the number of individuals who would accept the credit, the cost of the credit, and the extent to which the credit would reduce uninsurance. This section describes and notes the implications of the equations Gruber developed to predict take-up rates for each of the four groups being considered.
Currently covered by employer-provided group health insurance
The probability that a worker who is currently covered by group insurance in his or her name will take up the credit is simulated as
where E(group) denotes the worker's contribution to (or expenditures on) employer-provided group health insurance, E(priv) denotes the worker's expenditure on private insurance after receiving the tax credit, and C(group) denotes the total cost (employer's and worker's shares combined) of the group health plan. Accordingly, equation (1) says that the probability of a worker switching from group health insurance to a tax-subsidized private plan is a constant (0.625) times the proportional difference between the individual's current contribution to group insurance and the individual's anticipated expense for private insurance (after receiving a subsidy). The constant (0.625) can be interpreted as an elasticity of the probability of accepting the credit with respect to the savings from accepting the credit. Note that this elasticity is assumed to be less than one, implying relatively unresponsive behavior.
Note also that the simulation assumes that employer-provided insurance and private insurance offer identical coverage, deductibles, co-payments, and so on. As a result, the difference between the current contribution to employer-provided insurance and the post-subsidy private insurance premium is assumed to represent the full difference in expenditures incurred by the individual from accepting the tax credit.
We calculate P(accept) for each worker who has group coverage in his or her name (see Section 4.1), then apply the same P(accept) to dependents who are covered by the same policy.
As a result, the simulations account for the impact of the tax credit on both the primary insured and his or her dependents.
The implications of equation (1) will be clearer if we consider some examples. Table 1 shows the probability of accepting the tax credit in 11 cases where individuals are currently covered by employer-provided health insurance. These cases draw on the nationally representative data we use in the simulations below. In the first six cases, we take the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentiles of E(group), E(priv), and C(group) from those data-first for families with group health insurance coverage, then for single household heads with group coverage-and apply them to equation (1). For example, Case 1 represents a worker from a family covered by group health insurance at the 20th percentile of E(group), E(priv), and C(group). This worker currently makes no contribution to employer-provided group coverage (column 1). If the worker accepted the tax credit and switched to private coverage, his or her insurance expenditures would rise to $1,202 (column 2). Whenever E(priv) > E(group), as in this case, P(accept) is negative, which implies that the individual has a 0 probability of switching to private insurance. A glance at Table 1 shows that all cases based on the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentiles have 0 probability of switching from employer-provided to private insurance.
Cases 7 through 11 in Table 1 are five families or single household heads chosen from the CPS because they have a positive probability of switching from employer-provided to private insurance. In Case 7, the employed family member currently contributes $6,000 to employerprovided group coverage (column 1), which is the entire cost of the group health insurance (column 3). Because this worker and his spouse are young and in good health, private coverage is relatively inexpensive, so if the worker accepted the tax credit and switched to private coverage, his insurance expenditures (after the credit) would fall to $2,550 (column 2). The saving of $3,450 in health insurance expenditures (column 4) represents 59 percent of the total cost of the existing group plan (column 5). As a result, the probability of accepting the credit is 0.37 (0.625 € × 0.59-column 6). Cases 8 through 11 in Table 1 can be interpreted similarly.
Cases 7 through 11 in Table 1 make two points clear. First, workers who are likely to accept the credit tend to be paying for a large share of their employer-provided health insurance.
(Case 11 is an exception: This female household head is making a modest contribution to an employer-provided plan that is expensive relative to the plan she could buy in the private market.) As substantial employee contributions to employer-provided health insurance become increasingly common, the financial incentives to accept a tax credit-and presumably the likelihood of actually accepting-will increase. Second, the workers who are likely to accept the credit and switch from employer-provided group to private health insurance face low private health insurance premiums. Although it cannot be seen in Table 1 , inspection of the data underlying the table shows that Cases 7 through 11 are based on families and single household heads who are young and healthy; as a result, they can reduce their health insurance expenditures by switching.
Overall, the examples in Table 1 suggest that equation (1) generates low probabilities of accepting the tax credit and switching from employer-provided to private insurance, even when workers would substantially reduce their insurance expenses by switching.
2 This is confirmed in Table 2 , which displays frequency distributions of the probability of accepting the tax credit and moving to private health insurance that equation (1) generates when we apply it to nationally representative data. (Section 3 discusses these data.) In order to obtain an upper bound on the probability of accepting the tax credit, we perform an alternative simulation in which P(accept) = 1 whenever a worker with employerprovided health insurance in his or her own name would incur lower expenses by accepting the tax credit and moving to private insurance-that is, whenever E(priv) < E(group). Under this simulation, 20.7 percent of families with employer-provided insurance switch to private insurance, and 28.0 percent of single household heads with employer-provided insurance switch.
Currently covered by private nonemployer health insurance
Individuals who are currently covered by private health insurance have already shown a preference for nonemployer insurance, and many (or most) could be expected to accept a tax subsidy. Indeed, the tax subsidy would be a windfall to these individuals, and not to accept the subsidy would amount to leaving money on the table. Nevertheless, it is well known that not all individuals who are eligible for a wide variety of benefit programs actually apply for and receive the benefits for which they are eligible. For example, reviews of program take-up by Remler, Rachlin, and Glied (2001) and by Currie (2004) report the following take-up rates (that is, the percentage of eligible individuals who actually enroll) for various means-tested social programs:
• Why eligible individuals choose not to participate in programs that would appear to improve their well-being is a puzzle that has attracted much research. Early work on the issue, such as Moffitt (1983) , emphasized the stigma that may attach to participating in a program.
Subsequent work shifted the focus away from stigma and toward other kinds of transaction costs associated with participation (Currie 2004 (1999) have emphasized that agents may discount in a way that is "time inconsistent"-that is, they may weigh the present more heavily than a standard model based on rational choice would suggest they should. Madrian and Shea (2001) note that time inconsistency can lead to considerable "stickiness" in behavior; that is, individuals stay with a given choice-a pension plan, a telephone plan, or whatever-even though making a change would appear to improve their well-being. What is particularly interesting about the behavioral economics literature is that it may suggest ways of overcoming such apparently irrational behavior.
However, behavioral economics has not yet been used to design programs in a way that would encourage take-up.
Remler, Rachlin, and Glied (2001) have reviewed the evidence on take-up of social programs with an eye to understanding what that evidence might imply about the take-up of health insurance programs. They examine several factors correlated with take-up-program benefits, inconvenience of applying, cultural attitudes and stigma, and information-and conclude that lack of information about a program and inconvenience are likely to be the main barriers to participation in health-related programs. They suggest that automatic enrollment is the simplest way to ensure a high program take-up rate.
All told, experience with existing programs suggests that participation in a refundable tax credit for health insurance would be less than 100 percent, even among those who are currently privately insured. On the other hand, the transaction costs and stigma associated with welfare and some social insurance programs would likely be less under a refundable tax credit than under many social programs: it would be part of the tax system, in which most individuals already participate, and claiming the credit would be essentially anonymous. As a result, in the long run, participation in the EITC is perhaps a better gauge of the level of participation that might be expected under a tax credit than is participation in other programs mentioned above.
Gruber (2000a) makes upper-bound and lower-bound assumptions about whether someone currently covered by private health insurance would accept the tax credit. The lowerbound assumption is that 50 percent of those covered by private health insurance would accept.
The upper-bound assumption is that 90 percent would take up the credit. We follow his practice and simulate acceptance of the tax credit by those who are privately insured with a 50 percent lower bound and a 90 percent upper bound.
Currently covered by Medicaid
The probability that a family or individual currently covered by Medicaid will accept the credit is simulated as
where C(priv) denotes the total private health insurance premium, E(priv) denotes the expenditure on private insurance after receiving the tax credit [so C(priv) -E(priv) is the subsidy or tax credit received for private health insurance], and income denotes either family income or income per family member (see below). Accordingly, equation (2) says that the probability of switching from Medicaid to a tax-subsidized private plan increases as the subsidy increases relative to the premium paid for the private plan (the first term in parentheses) and falls as the premium rises relative to income (the second term in parentheses). The constant (0.2) is essentially an elasticity and implies that the probability of accepting the tax credit is (for Medicaid recipients) quite unresponsive to relative changes in the subsidy and income.
Equation (2) can be implemented in either of two ways. First, C(priv) and E(priv) can be imputed for an entire family, and income is family income. In this case, equation (2) yields a lower-bound estimate of the probability of accepting the credit. Alternatively, C(priv) and E(priv) can be imputed separately for each Medicaid-covered individual in the sample, in which case income is average income per family member. In this case, equation (2) yields an upperbound estimate of the probability of accepting the credit.
To see the implications of equation (2), we have calculated the probability of accepting the tax credit for six hypothetical Medicaid recipients (see Table 3 ). We take the 20th, 50th, and Table 4 shows frequency distributions of the probability of Medicaid recipients accepting the tax credit and moving to private health insurance that result from applying equation (2) to the nationally representative sample of Medicaid recipients used in the simulations below. As with equation (1), some imputations are required, this time for C(priv) and E(priv). For families, either family or individual measures of C(priv), E(priv), and income could be applied to equation (2), so we show two alternative distributions of P(accept). Using family-level data to impute C (priv) and E(priv) and using family income in equation (2) yields the distribution of P(accept) in column 1 of Table 4 . (These probabilities are used to give the lower-bound simulations reported in row 4 13 of Table 9 .) Using individual-level data to impute C(priv) and E(priv) and using income per family member yields the distribution in column 2 of Table 4 . (These probabilities are used to
give the upper-bound simulations reported in row 4 of Table 9 .) The mean P(accept) for families is 0.034 using family data and 0.072 using individual data (columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 ). For singles, only one set of imputations is possible, and the mean P(accept) is 0.021 (column 3 of Table 4 ).
Currently uninsured
For currently uninsured families and individuals, the probability of taking up the credit is simulated as
Note that equation (3) is identical to equation (2) except for the constant elasticity [0.625 in equation (3)]. Accordingly, equation (3) says that the probability of an uninsured family or individual taking up the credit and switching to private health insurance increases as the subsidy increases relative to the premium paid for the private plan, and falls as the premium rises relative to income. The constant elasticity (0.625) in equation (3) is higher than in equation (2) and implies that currently uninsured families and individuals respond more strongly than Medicaid recipients to changes in the subsidy and income. Nevertheless, the elasticity in equation (3) is well below unity, so the simulation assumes that the probability of uninsured individuals accepting the tax credit is rather unresponsive to changes in the subsidy and income. As with equation (2), equation (3) can be implemented either for an entire family or for each individual in the sample separately. As before, the family calculations yield lower-bound estimates of the probability of accepting the credit, whereas individual calculations yield upper-bound estimates. (2) generates a probability of 0.338 of accepting the $1,000 single tax credit and becoming insured. Table 6 shows frequency distributions of P(accept) that result from applying equation (3) to the nationally representative sample of uninsured families and individuals used in the simulations below. Again, imputations are required for C(priv) and E(priv), and for families we calculate two alternative sets of imputations, one using family-level data (and family income), the other using individual-level data (and income per family member). The mean P(accept) for families is 0.159 using family data and 0.290 using individual data. For singles, the mean P(accept) is 0.241 (column 3).
Data
Like Gruber's (2000a) by employer-provided insurance, we obtain lower-bound estimates of tax credit take-up that are virtually identical to Gruber's. As a result, we conclude that use of the February data on employer offers of health insurance is not a significant issue.
A key deficiency of the March CPS is that the data do not include the health insurance premiums paid by employers to cover workers who receive employer-provided health insurance.
Neither do they include the employee's contribution for those covered by employer-provided insurance. The CPS does report whether a worker is covered by health insurance, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics imputes the employer's contribution to the health insurance plan. But the BLS does not attempt to impute the health insurance premium or the employee's contribution. We use the Kaiser/HRET survey to compensate for these deficiencies.
The 1999 Kaiser/HRET survey attempted to collect data on the characteristics of up to four health insurance plans (conventional, HMO, PPO, and POS) in each of 2,694 firms. Because 755 of the companies either did not offer a health insurance plan or did not respond, the survey includes data on 1,939 companies offering 2,837 health insurance plans (many companies offered more than one plan), although data on some plans are incomplete. In addition to detailed characteristics of each plan, the data gathered by the survey include the health insurance premium paid by the firm and the employee contribution for each plan. As described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we use these data to impute the health insurance premium [C(group)] and employee contribution [E(group)] for each person in the CPS who was covered by employer-provided health insurance. We also use the Kaiser/HRET survey to make regional adjustments to the imputed private insurance premium [C(priv)]-see Section 4.3.
Imputations
Section 2 described the take-up equations that underlie the simulations-equations (1), None of these is observed in the CPS, so they must be imputed. This section describes the methods of imputation.
Premiums of those currently covered by group health insurance [C(group)]
We impute the total health insurance premium (or cost) for a person currently covered by group health insurance in two steps. First, using the Kaiser/HRET Survey data, we estimate two hedonic health insurance premium functions-one for family plans and one for single plans-by regressing the health insurance premium of each health plan coded in the data on company size (6 indicators), industry (9 indicators), an urban/rural indicator, census regional division (9 indicators), and 192 indicators that specify the characteristics of the plan. The resulting estimates are displayed in Table 7 . The mean plan characteristics are assigned to all observations in making the prediction.)
For a single worker, the characteristics of the worker's firm are substituted into the hedonic function for a single premium; for workers with dependents, the characteristics of the worker's firm are substituted into the hedonic function for a family premium. The result is an imputed group health insurance premium for each worker in the CPS who has a group health plan in his or 3 Note that the dependent variable in both regressions is the untransformed monthly premium. Inspection of the premium variables suggested they were approximately normally distributed, making this a natural choice. We also estimated regressions using the natural log of the family and of the single premiums as dependent variables and obtained essentially similar results. 4 Industry codes differ between the CPS and the Kaiser/HRET survey, so we created a crosswalk between the two classification schemes by matching two-digit industry codes in the CPS to the one-digit codes in the Kaiser/HRET survey. For example, CPS workers in two-digit industries 40 and 41 (hospitals, and health services except hospitals) are assigned to the Kaiser/HRET "health care" industry category; CPS workers in two-digit industries 36 and 44 (business services, and other professional services) are assigned to the Kaiser/HRET "high-tech" industry category.
her name. The mean and other descriptive statistics of the imputed premiums (computed using the CPS observations) are displayed in Table 8 (panel A).
Employee contributions to group health [E(group)]
For individuals currently covered by group health insurance, we must also impute the employee contribution to group health insurance. We do this in two ways. The first resembles the method described above for imputing the total health insurance premium of a person covered by group health: We use the Kaiser/HRET Survey data to estimate equations for the shares (or proportions) of the single and family health insurance premiums paid by the employer. (The specifications are similar to those described above for group health insurance premiums, and the estimates are displayed in Table 7 .) Then, for each worker in the CPS who has employerprovided health coverage in his or her name, we substitute the characteristics of each worker and his or her employer into the appropriate estimated function (either family or single). For each worker, this yields a predicted share of the group health premium paid by the employer [and a predicted employee's share as well because the employee's share is simply (1 -the employer's share)]. Finally, we multiply the imputed employee's share by the employer-provided health insurance premium that we imputed from the Kaiser/HRET data (Section 4.1) to obtain an imputation of the dollar employee contribution to his or her group health plan.
The second way of imputing the employee contribution to group health is more straightforward. The CPS includes an imputed annual employer contribution to health insurance.
We subtract this imputation from the annualized group health insurance premium that we imputed from the Kaiser/HRET data (Section 4.1) to obtain an alternative imputation of the employee's contribution to group health insurance.
Means and other descriptive statistics of employee contributions imputed using both of the above methods are displayed in Table 8 (panel B) .
Market premium faced by each individual [C(priv)]
Finally, we must impute the premium (or cost) an individual or family would pay for private nonemployer health insurance. To do this, we use the following function that Gruber (2000a, p. 33) developed using data on the age distribution of private nonemployer health insurance premiums (from Mutual of Omaha) and data on the distribution of medical costs by self-assessed health status (from Actuarial Research Corporation):
C(priv) = $120(health factor)(age factor) + regional factor.
In equation (4), $120 is the monthly premium for a single 40-year-old individual in excellent health. This can be thought of as a "reference premium," which is scaled up or down according to an individual's self-reported health status, his or her age, and his or her region of residence, each of which is reported in the CPS. Consider each of these factors in turn.
The age factor for a 40-year-old is 1 (because the 40-year-old is the reference case). For individuals under age 21, age factor is 0.456, implying that, other things equal, C(priv) of a young person is 45.6 percent that of a 40-year-old. For individuals 62-64, age factor is 2.8, implying that C(priv) of a 62-to 64 year-old is 2.8 times that of a 40-year-old. From these three points, it is a straightforward task to interpolate age factors for ages 21-39 and ages 41-61.
The health factor for a person who reports himself or herself to be in excellent health is 1 (the reference case, again). For a person in very good health, health factor is 1.21; for a person in good health, it is 1.84; for a person in fair health, it is 3.47; and for a person in poor health, it is 5.8.
The regional factors are the estimated coefficients of the regional indicators in the hedonic premium function displayed in Table 7 . Our assumption here is that private and group health insurance premiums are highly correlated regionally. For example, the regional factor for a family premium in New England is $54.63, in east north central states it is -$14.46, and so on. Note that regional factor enters equation (4) additively, whereas age factor and health factor enter multiplicatively.
For singles (that is, persons living alone or unrelated individuals in a larger household), we obtain C(priv) by first calculating $120(health factor)(age factor), then adding the appropriate regional factor from the single plan hedonic premium function. For a family, we obtain a family C(priv) by calculating $120(health factor)(age factor) for each individual in the family, summing, then adding the appropriate regional factor from the family plan hedonic premium function. families, all singles, and several subgroups of each. Not surprisingly, the monthly premium for families is more than twice the average single premium. Also, for workers who have group health coverage, the imputed group premiums are substantially lower on average than the imputed market premiums (compare panels A and C).
Once C(priv) has been imputed for each observation, it is a straightforward matter to calculate the tax subsidy that each person would receive. Subtracting this tax subsidy from C(priv) yields E(priv), the post-subsidy expenditure on private health insurance. Table 9 displays the main results of the simulation model described above. We discuss in turn the results for take-up rates, the number of individuals accepting the credit (including changes in the number of uninsured individuals), and the net government cost of the tax credit.
Results of the Simulations

Take-up rates, number of individuals switching, and uninsurance
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 display the simulated lower-and upper-bound take-up rates of each group, and columns 3 and 4 display the implied number of individuals in each group who accept the tax credit.
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For individuals currently covered by employer-provided group health insurance, the lower-bound simulations are based on equation 1, whereas the upper-bound estimates are based on the assumption that any worker with group health insurance who would reduce his or her expenses by accepting the tax credit will do so. The simulations yield a broad range of take-up rates-from 3.3 to 35.4 percent, depending on the underlying assumptions. The simulated range for the number of individuals who would switch from employer-provided to private insurance-from 5 to 53 million-is similarly wide, reflecting the wide range of simulated take-up rates. Simulations using employer contributions to health insurance imputed from the hedonic functions (row 1 of Table 9) give lower take-up rates than those using the BLS's imputed employer contributions (row 2 of Table 9 ). The lower-bound estimate of 3.3 percent is very close to Gruber's estimate of 3.2 percent, which suggests that we have managed to replicate Gruber's simulation method for workers covered by group health insurance. (Also, as already noted, it suggests that our inability to use the February CPS data on employer offers of health insurance is not a significant issue.)
Most analysts would argue that the upper-bound estimates in column 2 of Table 9 are unrealistically high. Nevertheless, as discussed in Section 2.1, the lower-bound estimates may well be too low, and little basis exists for choosing a most-likely point estimate within the range of simulated take-up rates. We suggest that the range of estimates shown is essentially too wide to be useful to policymakers and that further evidence and research will be needed to narrow the range.
For individuals covered by private nonemployer insurance, the lower-bound take-up rate is assumed to be 50 percent, and the upper-bound take-up rate is assumed to be 90 percent (row 3 of Table 9 ). The implied range for the number of privately insured individuals accepting the tax credit (from 10 to 18 million) is quite wide. The lower bound of this range exceeds Gruber's estimate of 8.6 million, which is curious because this is the most straightforward of the simulations performed.
For individuals covered by Medicaid, equation (2) yields a take-up rate of between 3.3 and 6.7 percent, which implies that between 0.6 and 1.3 million current Medicaid recipients would switch to private insurance (row 4 of Table 9 ). [Recall that the lower-bound estimates result from using family-level data to impute P(accept) for families, whereas the upper-bound estimates result from using individual-level data to impute P(accept).] Gruber's take-up rate for
Medicaid recipients is 1.8 percent, which suggests that fewer than 0.4 million current Medicaid recipients would switch to private insurance. Although our lower-bound estimates are slightly above Gruber's estimates, they are close enough to suggest that we have replicated Gruber's approach. The point is that the take-up rate for Medicaid recipients would be very low.
The simulations of uninsured individuals (row 5 of Table 9 ) are central to this exercise because they indicate the extent to which a tax credit would reduce uninsurance. For the uninsured, equation (3) yields a lower-bound take-up rate (and a corresponding reduction in the uninsured population) of 17.5 percent and an upper-bound take-up rate of 28.3 percent.
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It follows that the tax credit would reduce the number of uninsured by 7.7-12.5 million-from about 44 million (or 18.4 percent of the nonelderly U.S. population) to between 31.5 and 36.3 million (or 13.2-15.2 percent). Gruber's take-up rate (and the corresponding reduction in the uninsured population) is 11.1 percent, implying that about 4.7 million uninsured would become insured as a result of the tax credit. It appears that we have not replicated Gruber's simulation-our lower-bound estimates remain well above his-and it is unclear what accounts for the difference. In any case, it would be useful to compare the simulations in Table 9 with simulations that were based more convincingly on empirical estimates rather than on conjecture.
Finally, row 6 of Table 9 aggregates the implications of the simulations and shows that, all told, between 23.6 and 85.6 million individuals would accept the tax credit. Most of the breadth of this range comes from the wide take-up range we obtained for workers covered by employer-provided insurance.
Program costs
The net government cost of a refundable tax credit can be calculated in a straightforward manner from the simulations. First, consider individuals covered by employer-provided health insurance. For each of these individuals, the net cost of the tax credit (G) is the product of (a) the probability of accepting the tax credit and (b) the difference between the tax credit going to that individual and the tax expenditure on that individual if he or she continued to receive employerprovided insurance:
In equation (5) For each person covered by private nonemployer insurance and for each uninsured individual, the net cost of the tax credit is the product of (a) the probability of accepting the tax credit and (b) the tax credit going to that individual:
where the notation is as above.
For each Medicaid recipient, the net cost of the tax credit is the product of (a) the probability of accepting the tax credit and (b) the difference between the tax credit going to the individual [C(priv) -E(priv)] and the Medicaid expenditure on that individual:
where E(medicaid) denotes the government's Medicaid expenditure on the individual (U.S.
Census Bureau 2003).
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 9 display the resulting simulated net government cost for each group. For individuals covered by employer-provided insurance, the wide simulated range of net cost ($1.9-$22 billion) reflects the wide simulated range of take-up rates. The simulated range for those covered by private nonemployer insurance ($9.5-$17 billion) is also wide. Net government cost for those initially covered by Medicaid actually falls by $2.2-$4.9 billion because it is less expensive to subsidize private nonemployer insurance for these individuals than to provide them with Medicaid.
The simulations suggest that tax credit expenditures on those who were previously uninsured would be between $7.4 and $9.7 billion-or between $776 and $961 per newly insured person. However, the net government cost of the tax credit ranges from $16.6 to nearly $44 billion because the credit can be applied by groups other than the previously uninsured. If the low end of the range ($16.6 billion) pertains, then the average cost to insure a previously uninsured person under the tax credit would be just over $2,100. However, if the high end ($43.9 billion) pertains, then the average cost per previously uninsured person would be about $3,500.
(Note that these estimated costs take account of the fact that individuals who switch from employer-provided to private nonemployer insurance would give up a tax subsidy in the form of untaxed employer expenditures for health insurance.)
The simulation model we use makes performing sensitivity analysis straightforward. As more is learned about actual behavioral responses to health insurance tax credits, different behavioral parameters can be substituted into the model. Accordingly it should be straightforward to simulate the implications of new research using the model.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we have replicated simulations of refundable tax credits for health insurance reported by Gruber (2000a,b) and Gruber and Levitt (2000) . We have focused on clarifying the behavior Gruber and Levitt assume in their simulations, writing down the equations that specify the behavior of different groups of families and individuals, and describing the imputations needed to implement the simulations. The lower-bound estimates that result from our replication of Gruber's simulations accord closely with Gruber's estimates in two cases-workers covered by employer-provided health insurance and Medicaid recipients. They differ somewhat from his estimates in two other cases-individuals covered by private nonemployer insurance and the uninsured-although the differences are not large enough to raise concerns.
Overall, our simulations suggest that a relatively modest tax credit-$1,000 for a single individual and $2,000 for a family-would reduce the number of uninsured individuals by between 17.5 and 28 percent while requiring new government spending of between $16.6 and $44 billion, of which about $7.4-$9.7 billion would go toward covering previously uninsured individuals. Clearly, these ranges are quite wide and draw attention to the difficulty and uncertainty associated with modeling the impacts of tax credits for health insurance. Pauly and Herring (2001, 2002) and Pauly, Song, and Herring (2001) are even more emphatic in warning about the uncertainty inherent in simulating the effects of health insurance tax credits. They point to model specification and assumptions about the premiums faced by the uninsured as the main sources of uncertainty. These add up to great uncertainty about the extent to which families and individuals would take up a tax credit. As they write, "this uncertainty ...
should be front and center in the evaluation of tax credit schemes since we as analysts have minimal experience with large subsidies directed at low-income individuals" (Pauly, Song, and Herring 2001, p. 17) . In addition, some tax credit proposals could lead to broader changes in health insurance markets, such as greater price competition among insurers. This is yet another source of uncertainty in modeling tax credit proposals.
The next question is whether direct empirical evidence could reduce uncertainty about tax credit take-up rates. As discussed in Section 2, Remler, Rachlin, and Currie (2004) have reviewed evidence on take-up of a wide range of social programs and show that takeup rates vary greatly from program to program. Their reviews suggest that little basis exists for choosing a most likely point estimate from the range of simulated take-up rates displayed in Table 9 : the lower-bound estimates in column 1 of Table 9 may well be too low, and the upperbound estimates in column 2 may be optimistically high, but little more can be said.
Obtaining convincing empirical evidence on take-up of a health insurance tax credit will not be cheap: it may require a demonstration project or social experiment. But progress on the issue of tax credits for health insurance will require improved evidence on the likely take-up rate of a credit, and the time and expense of such a demonstration may well be justified if it leads to convincing estimates of how tax credits would expand coverage and what they would cost. Table 1 Implications of Equation (1) for Accepting the Tax Credit and Switching from Employerprovided Group Insurance to Private Health Insurance, Selected Cases 
Variable definitions are as follows: E(group) = worker's contribution (or expenditures) for employer-provided group health insurance; E(priv) = worker's expenditure on private insurance after tax credit; C(group) = total cost (employer's and worker's shares combined) of group health plan.
Figures in columns 1, 2, and 3 are derived from the 1999 Current Population Survey and 1999 Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Benefits. See Section 3 for a description of the data and Section 4 for a discussion of the required imputations.
Simulations assume that the employer-provided plan and the private plan offer identical coverage, deductibles, and co-payments. Accordingly, column (4)-the difference between the worker's contribution to the employer-provided plan and the worker's post-subsidy private insurance premium-represents the full difference in expenditures incurred by the worker from accepting the tax credit. Table 2 Frequency Distributions of the Probability of Accepting the Tax Credit [P(accept)] Generated by Equation (1) -
imputations of E(group) families singles families singles 
Distributions shown are based on a nationally representative sample of individuals covered by employer-provided group health insurance. See Section 3 for a description of the data and Section 4 for a discussion of the required imputations.
Simulations 1 and 2 derive from two alternative imputations of E(group) in equation (1). See Section 4.2 for discussion. Briefly, the distributions in Simulation 1 (columns 1 and 2) are calculated when E(group) is imputed from the hedonic health insurance and premium functions displayed in Table 7 (see also Table 8 , line B.1). The distributions in Simulation 2 (columns 3 and 4) are calculated when E(group) is imputed from the hedonic health insurance premium function in Table 7 and the BLS-imputed employer contribution reported in the CPS (see also Table 3 Implications of Equation (2) for Accepting the Tax Credit and Switching from Medicaid to Private Health Insurance, Selected Cases 
Variable definitions are as follows: C(priv) = premium for private nonemployer health insurance; E(priv) = expenditure on private insurance after tax credit; income = family income; "Income factor" in column (5) refers to the squared term in equation (2).
Data in columns 1, 2, and 3 are derived from the 1999 Current Population Survey and the 1999 Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Benefits. See Section 3 for a description of the data and Section 4 for a discussion of the required imputations. The simulations assume that Medicaid and the private plan offer identical coverage. Table 4 Frequency Distributions of the Probability of Accepting a Tax Credit and Switching from Medicaid to Private Health Insurance [P(accept)] Generated by Equation (2) -
Families Singles imputations based imputations based imputations based on family data on individual data on individual data 
Distributions shown are based on a nationally representative sample of Medicaid recipients. For the family distribution in column 1, P(accept) is calculated with C(priv) and E(priv) imputed using family-level data and income equal to family income. For the family distribution in column 2, P(accept) is calculated with C(priv) and E(priv) imputed using individual-level data and income equal to income per family member. See Section 3 for a description of the data and Sections 2.3 and 4 for a discussion of the required imputations. Table 5 Implications of Equation (3) for Accepting the Tax Credit and Switching from Uninsured Status to Private Health Insurance 
Variable definitions are as follows: C(priv) = premium for private nonemployer health insurance; E(priv) = expenditure on private insurance after tax credit; income = family income; "Income factor" in column (5) refers to the squared term in equation (3).
Data in columns 1, 2, and 3 are derived from the 1999 Current Population Survey and the 1999 Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Benefits. See Section 3 for a description of the data and Section 4 for a discussion of the required imputations. Table 6 Frequency Distributions of the Probability of Accepting a Tax Credit and Switching from Uninsured Status to Private Health Insurance [P(accept)] Generated by Equation (3)
Distributions shown are based on a nationally representative sample of Medicaid recipients. For the family distribution in column 1, P(accept) is calculated with C(priv) and E(priv) imputed using family-level data and income equal to family income. For the family distribution in column 2, P(accept) is calculated with C(priv) and E(priv) imputed using individual-level data and income equal to income per family member. See Section 3 for a description of the data and Sections 2.4 and 4 for a discussion of the required imputations. 
---------------------------------------------
Group health Proportion insurance premium paid by employer family plan single plan family plan single plan  --------------------------------------------- 10 ----------------------------------------------NOTES: OLS regressions estimated using Kaiser/HRET Survey of company health insurance plans. All plans with complete information are included in the sample. Many companies report multiple plans. In addition to the independent variables displayed, the regressions include 192 indicator variables for characteristics of the plan.
"ref" denotes the reference category in a set of dummy variables. * Significantly different from 0 at the 5% level (two-tailed-test). ** Significantly different from 0 at the 1% level (two-tailed test). Table 9 Results of Simulation: Group Take-up Rates, Number of Individuals Accepting Tax Credit, and Net Government Cost of Tax Credit ------------------------------------------- 
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----------------------------------------------NOTES:
For individuals covered by employer-provided group health insurance, lower-bound simulations are based on equation (1); upper-bound simulations are based on the assumption that all workers who would reduce their expenses by switching to private insurance do so. See Section 2.1. The alternative simulations for individuals covered by employer-provided insurance are based on two alternative imputations of E(group). See Section 4.2 and Table 2. For individuals covered by private nonemployer insurance, lower-bound simulations are based on the assumption that 50 percent of covered individuals accept the tax credit; upper-bound simulations are based on the assumption that 90 percent accept the tax credit. See Section 2.2.
For individuals covered by Medicaid and for uninsured individuals, lower-bound simulations are based on the assumption that decisions to accept the tax credit are made for entire families; upper-bound simulations are based on the assumption that decisions to accept the tax credit are made individually. See Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
